We have seen the actors and some of the ways they influence each other in setting their agendas. But regardless of what these actors consider as important, the question remains, what measures against conflicts can different actors actually take in foreign nations, and often quite distant conflict zones?
The answer depends on the options available to the particular actors, but these may include: exposing and drawing attention to the conflict, lobbying, boycotting products associated with the conflict, diplomacy (or peacemaking), providing humanitarian aid, imposing sanctions on parties to the conflict, military intervention, peacebuilding, or bringing those guilty of war crimes to justice. These can be broken down into indirect measures, measures short of military intervention and military intervention.
Indirect Measures
There can be no response to conflict unless it is known. This may seem obvious, but gathering information and making the existence of a conflict known to other actors is an important first step. This is something that the media in particular can do, as can NGOs on the ground and academics.
If these actors feel strongly that it is a conflict demanding greater attention and response, they take it a step further, lobbying policymakers to take action, the public may lobby politicians through petitions, or on the streets in public demonstrations or appeals; the media may use extensive and emotive media coverage; and academics may directly advise or provide recommendations to policymakers. The public may even boycott products that are believed to be contributing to the conflict, such as diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC. For the majority of the actors who are not policymakers, this is the extent of their influence on conflict and conflict resolution.
Measures Short of Military Intervention
A more direct option is use of diplomacy in mediating between parties to a conflict (also known as peacemaking). Such mediation may appear to be usually reserved for policymakers, but certain NGOs specialising in mediation are also becoming involved in peacemaking, such as Sant’Egidio or the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Mediation enhances communication between parties, and allows parties to pressure the other side and save face when compromising. Mediators may be ‘neutral’, simply enhancing direct interaction between parties, or they may be ‘principal’, using carrots or sticks to make an agreement more attractive (Princen, 1992: 11-31).
Principal mediators usually have some direct or indirect interest in the conflict. Providing humanitarian aid to those suffering as a result of conflict is another way of becoming involved in alleviating a conflict situation. Such action, however, involves treating the symptoms of conflict, and is not generally a contributing factor to conflict resolution.
Conversely, the provision of humanitarian aid is frequently used by parties to conflict to bolster their position and in certain situations may ironically contribute to the continuation of conflict. An expansion of humanitarian aid includes what is known as peacebuilding, activity seen as linking emergency aid and long-term development assistance. to encourage parties to remain faithful to peace agreements. This includes disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of parties to conflict.
Policymakers and the public have the power to contribute to the provision of humanitarian aid. Governments, the UN and associated agencies (such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme, WFP), NGOs and even individuals may provide aid, but there are attempts to coordinate the process to avoid gaps and duplication. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) within the UN makes consolidated appeals for specific emergencies, to which countries, organisations and individuals alike are invited to pledge and donate.
This means that OCHA may decide which emergencies it feels are most in need of assistance and encourage donations, but it is up to the donor to decide which emergency response it will fund. As much as 85 percent of funding to the UNHCR and WFP is ‘earmarked’., meanirig that the donors have specified which emergency and/or which project it will fund (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 187). Thus, it appears that it is states, rather than international organisations, that have the real power in determining humanitarian aid.
A more aggressive measure is the use of economic or diplomatic sanctions to coerce belligerent parties into ending conflict. Sanctions may range from travel bans against those in key leadership positions and bans on participation in international sporting events, to weapons bans and even comprehensive trade bans. This may be done unilaterally, or as a globally coordinated measure based on a UN Security Council resolution. It may be directed at a state or a party to a conflict within a state. The effectiveness of such sanctions depends on how willing and able the neighbours of the area under sanction (and those charged with overseeing the measures) are in enforcing them.
An additional measure (although usually applied in a post-conflict situation) is the use of criminal law to attempt to bring to justice those thought to be guilty of crimes committed during a conflict. This may be done– through ad hoc international criminal tribunals, or through the recently created International Criminal Court (ICC). There have also been attempts to bring such individuals to justice through national legal systems, even in foreign countries unrelated to the conflict itself.
Military Intervention
Where other measures have failed (or are assumed to be ineffective), military intervention may become an option. While this is a measure typically reserved for policymakers, governments facing rebellions have hired private security firms (as seen in Sierra Leone and Angola, for example), although this remains highly controversial. Within military intervention, there are a number of options at varying levels that policymakers have at their disposal. These include: the deployment of observers, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement action.
As the key international organisation in conflict resolution, the United Nations is often criticised for perceived inaction or weak response to conflict, as if it were a powerful organisation under unified command. The UN Secretariat does not have the authority or the resources to mount any type of intervention on its own.
Its Secretary General has the power to make recommendations and to manage peacekeeping operations once they have been authorised, but not to determine the size, scope or mandate of such operations. When an intervention is authorised, he must go door to door, trying to encourage countries to voluntarily provide troops, equipment and supplies. The Secretary-General in fact has little more than moral authority in this sense and is at the mercy of the member states.
The real power lies with the UN Security Council, a gathering of five permanent (or non-elected) members who each have veto power over any decision (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) and ten non-permanent (or elected) members.
Through its resolutions, which are forged through negotiations and power politics among its members, the Security Council decides what measures are to be taken in response to conflict, be they sanctions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or even full-scale enforcement action. Furthermore, resolutions are useless without implementation, and unless a country or a group of countries volunteers to field and sustain forces, resolutions authorising such action will simply not be adopted at all.
Peacekeeping was originally intended as a confidence building measure, and peacekeepers positioned themselves between two clearly defined adversaries, with the solid consent of both parties. They were typically lightly armed and their greatest assets were their neutrality and the fact that they would not use force. Such measures were adopted under what was colloquially called ‘Chapter Six and a half’ of the UN Charter, because peacekeeping is not specifically provided for in the Charter.
Chapter Six of the UN Charter regulates peacemaking and other measures for peacefully resolving conflicts, while Chapter Seven deals with more robust responses (sanctions and interventions) to threats and breaches of the peace. With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was increasingly being employed, but peacekeepers were more often than not being sent into situations where adversaries, frontlines and consent were unclear. That is, peacekeepers were being sent where there was little peace to keep. This was seen in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, and later in Sierra Leone and the DRC.
Peacekeeping in its traditional sense was not suitable for such situations, and stronger measures, which came to be known as ‘robust peacekeeping’ or ‘peace enforcement’ began to be introduced into mandates for intervention forces (under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter). This meant that the intervening group would use their force strength and the threat of force (but limited actual use of force) to deter aggressors and maintain peace.
But adapting to changes was slow, and willingness to actually contribute to such forces was weak, such that despite being provided with strengthened mandates, forces were rarely provided with adequate means to carry out the mandate. Despite having the mandate to protect their mission, their freedom of movement, and to protect civilians, for example, often they did not have the force strength, weaponry or logistics to realistically fulfil their mandate (Hawkins, 2004: 67-116).
This was rarely a problem in cases where states (or coalitions of states) were authorised to lead their own forces (rather than placing them under UN command) in peace enforcement missions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in post-conflict Bosnia, or Australia in East Timor.
In rare cases, the UN Security Council has also authorised states to use enforcement action (essentially unlimited use of aggressive force) to achieve a particular objective, such as ejecting Iraq from Kuwait or ejecting the military junta from Haiti. In terms of airlift, logistics and force strength, only the wealthiest countries generally have the capacity to carry out and maintain interventions beyond simple small-scale peacekeeping operations.
Below is a table looking at the differences in the types of military interventions from the perspectives of consent of the parties, impartiality (maintaining good relations with the parties or ensuring the implementation of the mandate), force level deployed and the use of force authorised. The area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is a ‘grey area’, and the situation and measures used are often unclear and may change depending on events and the judgment of the commanders on the ground.
| Peacekeeping | Robust peacekeeping | Peace enforcement | Enforcement action (war-fighting) | |
| Charter of UN Charter invoked | Six and a half | Seven | Seven | Seven |
| Consent of parties | Strong | Possibly weak | Weak | None |
| Impartiality | To the parties | Unclear | To the mandate | None |
| Force level | Weak | Variable | Strong (as /deterrent) | Very strong (for dominance) |
| Use of force | Self-defense | Self-defense, freedom of movement etc | To accomplish the mandate (limited) | To accomplish the mandate (unlimited) |
